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Labor Markets and the Choice of Technology inan Open Developing Economy
ABSTRACT
Thispaper highlights economicfactorsdetermining the choice of technology and
openness in an intertemporal context in the presence of Institutionalconstraints In
the labor market. It considers the case in whicha more aggressive- development
strategy involves an investment in a modern technology. Thistechnology raises the
degree to which real wages and productivity depend on external factorswhile at the
same time It also raises the expected value of real Income.In the absence of Such
investment, productiontakesplace in a traditional sector, using a technology that
limitsexposure to external shocks. The analysis evaluates thedependence of the
choice of technology on the volatilityof theshocksaffecting the economy, the
expected productivity gains, the Investment cost associatedwith the modern
technology, and the attitude towards risk. It starts with a benchmarkcase of a
flexible wage/employment economy. Thedependence of openness, investment, and real
wages on the attltuae towards risk is derived for suchaneconomy.Thepaper then
proceeds to analyze the implications of departures fromthe benchmark model.
Specifically, it evaluates the effects ofminimum wage policy onthe choice of
technology. it is demonstrated that institutional constraints in thelabor market tend
todiscourage adoptionofnew technologies. The importanceof this effect depends
onthe volatility of the underlying shocks.A rise In the volatilitytends to be
associated with a drop in the degree to whicha given institutional structure
constrains the move to the new sector. Thus, turbulent
periods provide opportunities
forstructuralshifts in favor of thenew sector.The analysis assesses both the
positiveaspects of policies and the welfare costs associated withdepartures from
fully flexible labor markets. It also discussesthe interaction between institutional
structureofthelabor market and the use of protectivemeasures that attempt to
reduce exposure to external shocks.
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Theremarkable difference in thegrowth patternof Latin American and East
Asian nations has been documented inseveral studies1. Understanding this difference
is an important task, because itshouldhighlight key economic considerations that
affect the design of growth policies. Thepurpose of this paper is to focus on the
interplayof several factors that Influence thechoice ofgrowth policies: attitudes
towardsrisk ;perceptions regarding the cost/benefit ofexposure to international
trade; andlabor market policies.
Thedifferential growth pattern Is reflected inthe fact that the average per
capita GOP 9rowth rate of East Asian nationswas 4.9% during 1960-77, whereas it
was 3.1% for the Latin American nations.
During that period the export share of the
GOP of East Asian nations rose from22.6% to 40.2% whereas it wasrelatively
stable for the Latin American nations,rising only from 13.8% to 14.9%2. The
differential growth patterns of Latin Americanand East Asian nations have
persistedfor a longenough periodto suggestthat theymay reflect different
attitudes regarding openness and thedesirability of international trade, A rough
comparison suggests thatEast Asiannationswere applying outward—oriented
policies, whereas most Latin American nations
preferred inward—looking policies. The
growthof East Asian nations has occurredduring decades when outward policies
have been Particularly well suited to theglobal trend of growth and less restricted
international trade.
An important policy question iswhy these different policies were chosen. One
contributing factor may be a different evaluationof the costs/benefits of outward
policies.The experience of Latin American nations inthe decade 1930—1940 induced
aframe of mind In whichexternaltrade was related to greater exposure toadverse
externalshocks, whereas inward policies were viewedas successful in reducing-3
vulnerabilityto foreign shocks. Inward policies were not perceived to be costly as
long as external shocks were contractionary andinternal shocks were negligible. Once
that situation was reversed, and external shocks became expansionary and internal
conditionsless stable, the cost of inward policies became apparent. Yet the political
systemwas not flexible enough to adjust itspolicies to the new economic trends,
andpolicies that had been viewed as successful (or less costly) in the 1930's and
1940's penalized the growth of Latin American nations when applied in the 1960's
and 1970's. The history of the East Asian nations is different. They were less
exposed to the adverse shocks of the 1930's, and apparently they entered the 1950's
with no historic bias against international trade. Actually, the experience of some of
them in the 1930's and 1940's suggested International trade as a source of growth. In
this sense they viewed outward policies more favorably, and their policies fitted
1960's and 1970's well.
At risk of simplification, it Is constructive to contrast the experience during
the 1930's and 1940's of two countries whose growth performances diverged during
the 1960's and 1970's -- Argentina and Korea. (The average per capita GDP growth
rate of Argentina was 2.1% during 1960—77, whereas it was 6.7% for South Korea).
While both maintained reasonable growth rates in the 1930's and 1940's, Argentina
did so by means of inward growth policies, while Korea adopted an outward
orientation (see Table - i). It is noteworthy that as a practical matter the
depression of the 1930's had no effect on the growth performance of Korea, whereas
it affected Argentina to some degree. The Korean experience was characterized by
increased trade with Japan whereas the Argentinlan experience was characterized by
inwardgrOwth" which was viewed as thesource of Argentina's relative success In
shielding itself from the depression.
These observations suggest that the Latin American and East Asian nations
entered the 1950's with divergent perceptions regarding the cost/benefit of inward
growth,resulting in a different choice of growth strategies. The purpose of this paper-4--
TABLE 1
Per Capita Commodity Product*
(rates of growth per year) in Korea
Per Capita Goods production in






Trade Ratio in Korea Trade Ratio in Argentina
(Export+ I mports)/2 (Export+ I mports)/2
Commodity Product NP
1920-1925 23.3%
1925-1930 32.8% 1925-1929 24%
1931-1935 35.7% 1930—1934 15.8%
1938-1940 46.1% 1935-1939 15%
Sources The Information on Korea draws onSang-Chul Suh (1978. pages 43, 119).
The information on Argentina draws on the U.N.Economic Survey of Latin America
(1951; pages 98. 107).
CommodityProduct is defined as the net output originating inagriculture,
forestry, fishery, mining, and manufacturing(See Sang-awl Suh (1978)).-5-
is to provide a framework for the analytical assessment of the economic factors
determining adoption of an inward growth strategy. This Is done by modeling an
outward p01 Icy as the choice to invest in a new technology that raises the
dependence of productivityonforeign shocks, thereby reducing its dependence on
domestic shocks. Our choice to model external dependence as a choice of technology
isarbitrary in thesense that all the results can be derived for the case where
externalshocks manifest themselves as shocks to the terms of trade, and the choice
Is between growth in sectors with a different exposure to external shocks.
Theanalysis evaluates the dependence of the choice of technology on the
volatilityof the shocks affecting the economy, the expected productivity gains, the
investment cost associated with the modern technology, and the attitude towards
risk4.Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 applies it toa benchmark case of
aflexible wage/employment economy. Thedependence of openness, investment, and
real wages on the attitude towards risk is derived for such aneconomy. The analysis
demonstrates that for a significant degree of risk aversion, labor benefits from the
newtechnology ifthe gain in expected productivity compensates forthe greater
volatility of foreign relative to domestic shocks.Atthesametime, capital owners
willbenefit from adoption of the new technology if the expected productivity gain
andthe volatility of foreign shocks outweigh their investment costs in the new
technology. As a result, a rise in the volatility of foreign shocks tends to work in
divergentdirections for each group (i.e., labor and capital owners).
The analysis characterizessituations where the interests of the groups diverge.
Thiswill arise If the gain in expected income attributed to the new technology does
not suffice to compensate risk averse workers for the greater exposure to foreign
shocks attributed tothe new technology, while at the same time the expected profits
sufficeto justify the investment from the perspective of the entrepreneurs. In these
circumstances, the adoption of the new technology will be influenced by the relative
strengthofthe two opposed factors. Protective policies can be introduced as a-6-
mechanismdesigned to resolve the conflictbyraising the expected Income enough to
compensate labor for the exposure to external risk. This will be the case where
exposure to the new technology Is accompanied by protective policies. While such
policies can achieve their goal, theyaredominated byalternativepolicies that deal
directlgwith the "missing margin". The role of such policies Is tocompensate for
themissing market for risk. This is done by facilitating the transfer of the income
riskfrom labor to the entrepreneurs, thereby eliminating the conflict ofInterest
regarding the new technology. This can be accomplished by labor market institutions
such as contracts that guarantee a certain level ofwages and emplogment5. If such
contracts are not credible, policies that will move theeconomy towards the desired
risk redistribution will be beneficial. These policies willcontribute to the
elimination of the conflict between the factors of production,enhancing the chances
ofthe adoptionofthe technology.
Section 4 proceeds to analyze the implications of departures from thebenchmark
model.Specifically, it evaluatesthe effects of a minimum wage policy on the choice
oftechnology. It is demonstrated that Institutional constraints In the labor market
tend to discourage the adoption of the new technology. The importance of thiseffect
is determined by the volatility of the underlying shocks. A rise involatility tends
to be associated with a drop in the degree that a given institutionalstructure
constrains the move to the new sector. Thus,turbulent periods provide opportunities
forstructural shifts In favor of the new sector. Theanalysis assesses both the
positiveaspects of the policies and the welfare costs associated with departures
from fully flexible labor markets. It is shown that because thepresence of minimum
wages diminishes the chance of adopting the new technology, there is a greater
potentialrole for labor market Institutions.Section 5 closes the paper with
concludingremarks.
Beforeturning to the more formal model, it is noteworthythat the problemof
the choice of technology is more important forDeveloping countries than for-7
developed nations. In the presence of complete markets, the choice of technology
tends to be independent of preferences, and standard separation theorems apply. This
result does not hold for Developing countries, whose credit markets are not fully
developed. For these countries the choice between technologies will be determined by
preferences, and the Interests of labor and capital owners may diverge. In these
circumstances the adoption of protective policies and growth strategies will be
influenced b the relative strength of sectors and of owners of inputs.
2. THE MODEL
Inthis section we outline a minimal modelto describe the factors affecting the
intertemporal choice oftechnology In the presence of incompleteinformation and
risk—averseworkers. This is done in atwo—periods framework where inperiodone
the economy has the option to invest in acquiring a new technology that will be used
in period two. The new technology Involves greater exposure to external shocks, and
we assume that it involves an irreversible change in the process of production.
2.1. The Production Side
We consider an economy facing the choice between a traditional and a new
technology.The traditional technology is given by:
(1) x =exp(6)L
:
where output(x) is produced by labor input (L). The productivity of labor is subject
todomestic shocks (6), distrIbuted normally with mean zero and variance V6. For a
given realization of S the wage is given by
(2) w exp(6).-8-
If investment I Is undertaken In period one, theeconomy will produce in period two
using the following process:
(3)Xt1 AM'L°
where M stands for an imported input, A is the efficiency coefficient,andstands
for the output obtained using the new technology. Weassume thatinstalling the
second technology involves an Irreversible change In the capitalstock, Implying that
following the Investment the economy cannot apply the old productionprocess. To
capture the notion that openness can expose theeconomy to external shocks we
assume that the external price of the Imported Input is Subject to Shocks,
denoted by . Our choice to model external dependence In the form ofimported Input
Isarbitrary in thesense that all the results can be derived for the case where
externalshocks manifest themselves inshocks to the terms of trade and the choice
oftechnologyIsalso a choice between sectors with a differentexposure to external
shocks.The choice of the technology embodied in (1)and (3) is motivated by the
presumptionthat the new technology Involveshigher capital Intensity.For simplicity
of exposition we take the extreme case where the traditionaltechnology does not use
capital.
Consider the case where the price of M isgiven by
('1)m =exp(€), N(8,VE).
The use of labor and the Imported Input is at a level that minimizesthe
production costs, yielding the following first order conditions:-9-
(5) = m exp (e)
(6) = LW
ApplyIng(3) and (5)-(6) we obtain that
(7) x' = AI$w/{ocexp(6))Ik°';
(8) w exp(p -
where s's$/(i-)and p tnt
The introduction ofthenew technology implies that the productivity of labor is
determinedby ameasure related to the efficiency of the new technologyand theprice
ofthe imported Input (p and c In (8)). The value of s corresponds to the drop in
labor productivity due to the supply shock induced by the rise in the cost of the
imported input. The value of p corresponds to the gain in productivity due to the
adoption of the new technology.
2.2. Preferences
6
The economy is composed of risk averse workers and risk neutral entrepreneurs.
The second-period utility of a representativeworker Is given by:
(g)H -kexp(-eu) where U (2—L)c
whereC stands for the consumption and we normalize leisure endowment to 2. The
attitude towards risk is measured by e -- a higher e implies a higher aversion to
risk.- 10-
The problem facingtheentrepreneur in period oneIsto determine If the switch
to the new technology is desirable. Such a switch necessitates an investment i in
period one,andwe assume the entrepreneur facesanopportunity cost of capital given
byr.in the next sections weevaluate the conditionsunderwhich the entrepreneur
willundertake the Investment, and the conditions under which the adoption of the
newtechnologywill raise the expected utility of the workers.
3. The Choice of Technology - the Flexible Wage Case
We start by considering a benchmark case where the labor market is assumed to
be flexible. Note that the employment level using both technologies Is L:1. The
consumption level of a worker using the old technology is C = exp(8). Thus, the
workers expected utility using the old technology is (denoting by E the expectation
operator)
(10) E(H) = —kElexp(—eC)J; where C = exp(8).
Applying (8) we obtain that the wage level with the new technotogtj is
exp(p -. and the corresponding expected utility using the new technology is H
(ii) E( H) -kEtexp(-eC'1)1where cn = exp(p -
3.1 Welfare ComDarison - Labor
We turn now to an evaluation of the welfare implications of the new technology.
This is done by calculating the expected utility of a representative worker, Obtained
by applying a second-order Taylor approximation of H1 around ' = 0 and of H— 11—
around S = 0. This procedure results in approximations whose accuracy isdetermined
by the variances ofand of S. Henceforth we assume these variances to be small
enough to merit the applicability of the resultant approximations. Using (ii) we get
that
(12) Ht -k exp{-ew0fl 1 - 8 U(0)€ — .5(8 u-(e) - (eu(e))2)(s)2J
where w0 is the real wage (8) obtained for s = 0 (w0 = exp(p)). Applying the
expectation operator to (12) we conclude that
(13) E( H'1)— k exp{-ow0 )I I- .5V. {e u"(o) - (eu(e))2)J
Direct calculation reveals that
(14) E( H'1)- k exp(-0w0 ) 1 1+.5V()0wØ (Ow0 - 1)).





The new technolo9y will be adopted if E(H') >E(H).Togain further insight into
the factors that determine the choice of technology we assume that the variances of
and S are small ,andthat the value of w0 is close to one. Subject to these
assumptions,we can conclude that with flexible labor markets the adoptionof the
newtechnology is advantageous if- 12-
(16) p > 5(0 - 1)EV(5.) - V(5)J.
Equation 16 has a simple interpretation in terms of "mean-variance"analysis. The
left-hand term is a measure of the expected rise in income due to theadoption of the
new technology. The right hand—side Is a subjective measure of the rise Involatility
that Is associated with the adoption of the new technology,being equal to the spread
of the variances of the foreign and domestic shocksweighted by a term related to the
degree of risk aversion. The adoption of the new technology is expected to benefit
labor if the gain in productivity outweighs the rise in thevolatility of income by a
factor of 5(0 — 1)-i.
Togain further insight, we turn to Figure One in which lineA1A2 plots
combinations of (V(€.); p) that leave labor indifferent to bothtechnologies. Whenever
the degree ofrisk aversion exceeds a threshold (e >1) a rise in thevolatility of
foreign shocks must be accompanied bya corresponding rise in the productivity gain
ofthe new technology in order to keep labor indifferent between thetwo
technologies. Noticethatfor low degreesofrisk aversion A1A2 is
downward—sloping, This corresponds to the case where volatility is a "virtue" (in
terms of (14),(15) a rise in the volatility of productivity shocks raisesexpected
welfarefor 0 <IJ. This result stems from the convexityof profits and the derived
laborincome with respect to the productivity shocks, which in turn implies that
higher volatility raises expected income7. Henceforth we will assume that thedegree
of risk aversion is high enough to causethe adverse effect of higher volatility to
dominate the beneficial effect of the rise in expected Income(formally, that 0 > 1),
as Is assumedInFigure One. The area aboveA1A2defines the region where labor














A1A2 downwards, increasing that area. This corresponds to the fact that higher
domestic volatility makes investment in openness more attractive. A risein the
de9ree of risk aversion rotates A1A2 counter clockwise around point K,thereby
reducing the advantage of the new technology If foreign exceeds domestic volatility.
3.2 Welfare ComDarIson - EntreDreneurs
The decision to undertake investment in the newtechnology is determined by
risk-neutralentrepreneurs. The residual Income correspondsto the capital share In
costs.Applying (11) we find that the entrepreneurs Income Is
(17) [(1-o—$)/odexp(p-s).
The entrepreneur will Invest in the new technology If theexpected Income exceeds
the cost of capital, or if
(18)Ef ((1—oc—$)/oj exp(p—€')) > (1+r)i
wiere r Is the opportunity cost of capital. Applying a second-orderTaylor
approximation to (18) around c' 0 we obtain that the condition for undertaking the
investment can be approximated by
(1w)ln((1+r)IJ< p + in [(1—oc—a)/ocj + .5V8)
Line C1C2 (Figure One) plots combinations of(V(€.). p) where the entrepreneur is- 14-
indifferent regarding the new technology. The area above C1C2 defines the region
where the entrepreneur expects to benefit fromthe new tecnnologg. It is noteworthy
thatC1C2 is downward sloping. This reflects the convexity of profitswith respect
to the productivityshocks,which in turn implies that higher volatility raises
expected Income.
3.3 The Choice of Technology and Potential Conflicts
We now combine the information summarized in curves A1A2 and C1C2 to assess
the dependency of the choice of technology on preferences, volatility, and costs. We
will identify circumstances where there is a conflict of interest between the inputs,
and we will address the role of policies in these circumstances. Notice that
whenever the expected productivity gain from the new technology is high enough
(relative to volatility measures) there is no conflict of interest between labor and
capital. This corresponds to points like 2. For relatively low productivity gain,
potential for conflict exists. For example, If foreign volatility is high, capital
ownerswilltend to benefit from the new technology, whereas labor will tend to lose
(see point s3). At that point the expected change in wages does not compensate for
the rise involatilityof incomeattributableto the new technology. This conflict of
interestcan be resolved by protective policies which can be viewed as policies
attempting to raise the returns to factors in the new industry. In terms of our
example such a policg can raise p, thereby shifting point S3 up, solving the
8
conflict
While a protective pollcg is capable of resolving the conflict, it will Introduce
newcosts. If the purpose of the protective policy Is to allow both labor and capital- 15-
to benefit from the new technology, alternative and more effectivemeans are
available. The potential for welfare-improving policies arises fromthe fact that our
economy lacks a market for risk. Institutions or policies that would work directlyon
the missing margin would be superior to protectivemeasures. In order to
demonstrate this point let us apply Figure One. Suppose oureconomy Is at point S.
The distance S1N Is a measure of the compensationneeded to make labor indifferent
between the traditional and the new technology (measuredas a percentage of the
wage, w0). Similarly, S1N is a measure of the expected rentgenerated by the new
technology ( measured as percentage of the investment cost. I(1+r)). If theexpected
rent exceeds the needed compensation, a redistribution ofincome can resolve the
conflict.
More effective means are measures that will redistributeboth risk and income.
For example, consider a credible contract offeredby the entrepreneur to employ labor
at the level observed in a competitive equilibrium (L1), paying a fixed real wage.
In order to derive the wage contract note that distance0A1 (Figure One) is equal to
(o-1).5v(8). This is also a measure of the willingness of the worker to'pay' in
expected income to stabilize his real Income earned with the traditional
technology
—- labor employed with the traditionaltechnology is indifferent between the random
income (exp(s)) and a fixed real income (givenby 1- (O-1).5V(8)). Thus, point A1
defines the reservation wage (i-(o-1).5v(8)) that will make labor indifferent
between the old technology and the new in thepresence of the contract. Subject to
this contract the expected rent increasesby the distance
The contract has the effect of shifting theexposure to Income risk introduced
by the new technology (as represented by V€.) from labor to theentrepreneur. Notice- 16-
that a point below A1B (like represents a situation where the proposed contract
calls for an income redistribution from the entrepreneurs to labor. The needed
redistribution is measured by the distance S0S2 (in wage units). This is a feasible
contractonlyif the initial rent In point S2 exceeds the needed redistribution. Using
thatobservation we can define a locus C3C4of points where the rent equals the
neededtransfer9. The proposedcontractis feasible onlyaboveline C3C4. This
contractwill eliminate the conflict of interest for all the 'risk-return' combinations
that are represented by points above C3C4 and below A1A2.
While the contract offers an efficient solution to the conflicts between the
inputs,Itmay lack credibility because it Impliesthat in'bad' states of nature labor
is paid above its marginal product. In the absence of a credible enforcement
mechanism, the contract might not be feasible.In these circumstances, tax-cum—
subsidy state-dependent policies that will move the economy towards the desired
risk redistribution will be beneficial. These policies will contribute to the
elimination of the conflict between the factors of production, enhancin9 the chances
of adopting the technology.
Figure One is instructive in Interpreting the dependency of the choice of
technology on perceptions regarding the relative volatility of domestic to foreign
shocks. Note that point K is determined by the domestic volatility (v8). Thus, a drop
in domestic volatility shifts A1A2 upwards, reducing the desirability of the new
technology. For a given degree of risk aversion and domestic volatility a point like Z
represents an equilibrium where there is no conflict between labor and capital, and
thenewtechnology is adopted. A country thatperceives foreign shocks as more
volatile will Identify the same technology with a point like Z'. At that point there
is a conflict of interest between the various factors of production, and the adoption- 17-
of the new technology will be determined by the relativeefficiency of the labor
market and domestic policies in enhancing beneficial risk redistribution,
'1. The ChoiceofTechnology --theMinimum Wage Case
Thepurposeof this section Is to illustrate the effects of minimumwage policy
onthe choice of technology.This is done by consideringan example where a minimum
wage regulation that does not affect the equilibrium with the traditional technology
has consequences regarding the attractiveness of the newtechnology. This would be
the case if the new technology Involved exposure to a more volatileenvironment. In
these circumstances the adoption of the newtechnology in the presence of the
minimum wage will Imply spells of unemployment In bad states ofnature which
reduce the desirability of the new technology. In order to overcome thiseffect, the
technology shouldgeneratea compensatory gain in productivity. Unlike the finding
with aflexible labor market, a higher volatility is shown to raisethe relative
attractivenessof the new technology for flQmfactors of production. This finding
results from the fact that, in the presence of a minimumwage, a mean preserving
rise in volatility will Increase the expected gain from thenew technology because it
will Increase benef Its in good states without affecting losses in badstates when the
minimum wage dictates unemployment.
To simplifyexposition,let usconsiderthe case where the traditional technology




-h probabilIty .5- 18-
Notice that V. h2. In a flexible wage economy the interests of both factors are
represented by a special case of Figure One, where 0 implies that points K and
0 coincIde. This situation is drawn inFigureTwo, where A1A2 and C1C2 have the
same interpretation as in Figure one. Thus, In the absence of a minimum wage
regulationlabor willbenefit from the new technologyabove A1A2 .whereas
entrepreneurswill benefit above C1C2
Consider now the case wherea minimum wage Isset at a leveldictatedby the
traditional sector, implying that wages cannot fall below Wm =1.WhIle this law
does not affect the traditional sector, it implies that with the newtechnology
unemployment can occur inbad states of nature. Let us recallthat (8) implies that
withthe new technology theequilibriumwage is given in bad states of nature by
exp{p -h).Thus, whenever h exceeds p. unemployment will occur Inbadstates of
nature.This will be the case if the volatility of foreign shocks (measuredby /)
exceedsthe productivity gain (p). Henceforth we will assume that p <hand that in
states of unemployment the utility of labor (U)Is given by U0 ( 0 U0
'1).
corresponding to the possibility of a non-market production.
Laborwill benefit from the new technology if the following condition is met:
(28) .5( —k exp(—8u0) —k exp(-e exp(p+ h))J >—kexp(-e)
The right hand side of (20) is the utility in the traditional sector, where U 1. The
left hand side is the expected utility with the new technology, being an average of










Uexp(p+h)). Equation (20) allows us an assessment of the potential role of
volatility. Assuming thattheconditionsfora binding minimum wage in bad states
hold (i.e. p < h).itcan be shown that if 0(1- 1i0) > In 2 then the new technology is
undesirable forany V(s.). This is because a high enough degreeof risk aversion (0)
and low enough non—market productivity ( U0) imply that with the new technology the
dropInutility in bad states is toolargeto be compensated for in good states. If.
however, e(i- U0) < In2,then for large enough p h laborwillbenefit from the
new technology.
Highervolatility enhances therelative attractiveness of the new technology
because a rise in h has the effect of raising utility in goodstates,without a
correspondingdrop in badstates. The same result can be derived for a case of a
continuousdistribution of c.Thisresult stems from the fact that the minimum wage
truncates the distribution of the effective productivity of labor in bad states. In
general, for truncated distributions a mean preserving spread of the underlying
variable (€inour case) puts greater weight on the tails, resulting in a higher
expected value of the effective productivity. Curve 6102inFigure Two plots
configurations of (V(6.); p) that leavelabor indifferent betweenthe two
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technologies.The area above 0162 defines the region where labor expects to benefit
fromthe new technology. The curve is downward sloping because a rise Involatility
raisesexpected utility with the new technology, allowing a drop in the reservation
value of productivity gain, p. It can be shown that a drop in the degree of risk
aversion shifts 6162 downwards.
The entrepreneur will benefit from the new technology if the expected income
exceedsthe cost of capital, or If- 20 -
(21).51(1 -cc - exp{p+h}> i(i+r)
Asin the flexible labormarketcase, volatility enhances the relative attractiveness
of the new technology from the entrepreneurs point of view. CurveF1F2inFigure
Twoplots configurations of combinations of (V(€.); p ) that leave the entrepreneur
indifferent with respect to the new technology. The area aboveF1F2 defines the
region where entrepreneurs expect to benefit from the new technology.
Acomparison between the flexible wage case (curves A1A2 and C1C2) and the
minimum wage case (curves 61G2 and F1F2) reveals that while highervolatility of
foreign shocks enhances the possibility of conflicts between inputs with flexible
wages, it works in the opposite direction with minimum wages. Note that because the
presence of minimum wages diminishes the chance of adopting the new technology.
there is a greater potential role for labor market institutions of the type elaborated
in section 3.3. For example, a point like S' (Figure 2) corresponds to aneconomy that
adopts thenew technology in a flexible wage equilibrium, but adopts the traditional
technologyin the presence of the minimum wage. Notice that a contract that will fix
wages and employment at w:1 and 1:1 will preempt the effect of the minimum wage,
enabling the attainment of an efficient equilibrium. If such contracts are not
credible, a minimum wage policy will generate a greater demand for protection. The
role of protective measures is to overcome the potential adverse consequences of the
minimum wage on the employment level associated with the new technology in bad
states.While suchpolicies can achievetheir goal,theyare dominated by alternative
policiesthat deal directly with market imperfect ions.- 21 -
5. ConcludIngRemarks
This paper describes an economy where a greater openness can result in a
conflict of interest between labor and capital. A wag to resolve the conflict Is to
accompany the exposure to greater openness with protective policies. While
protective measures can achieve that 9oatfora given sector, they impose new
welfare costs. Thus, protective policies are dominated bymoredirectmeansthat
willredistribute risk in an efficient manner, shifting tne labor income risk to
entrepreneurs,allowing a drop inthe expectedwage needed to interestLabor in the
newtechnology and raising thereby the expected income of entrepreneurs. This
accomplishes a resolutionof the conflict without Imposing the welfare cost
associated with protective policies.
Theresults of this study suggest that greater attention should be given to the
interactionbetweenInstitutionalaspects of the labor market and the choice of
growth policies. Such an Interaction Is of special relevance for LDCs because their
lack of fully developed domestic credit markets puts a greater burden on labor market
institutionsas a means of risk redistribution.--
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(1975) and Baily (1974).
6.The keg assumption is that inputs differ in their attitude towards risk and
their excess to the capital market. For exposition purposes we consider a special
case where entrepreneurs are risk neutral. The discussion can be extended for the
case where both labor and entrepreneurs are risk averse, and where inputs differ in
their effective mobility across activities. This difference plays a keg role, because
potential mobility acts like an insurance that allows grater diversification across
states.
7. For a more general discussion of the welfare effects of volatility see Newbery
and Stiglitz (1981).
8.In terms of our example these policies are in the form of implicit subsidies
applied to the new technology, like using a more favorable exchange rate for the
imported Inputs. It can be shown that if the exchange rate favors imports of M at a- 23-
rate of 5m then d p/d Sm/(i-) where Sm defines the percentage spread
between the exchange rate applied for the final good X and the imported input M. If
the new technology Is modeled as an Investment in a new sector, then protective
policiescan be In the form of a tariff that raises theprice ofrelative to other
activities.
9. It can be shown that C3C4 Is parallel to C1C2,andis defined by the
Conditionthat +p = inIoc{1-
.5(O—1)V8
+(1+ r)fl].
10.Formally, curve G1G2 is defined by[Vs. , p1 that satisfy
.51 -kexp(-eu0) -k exp(-e exp{p+ h))J-k exp(—e) and p< h(h/7).-24-
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